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Abstract
The literature on international organizations tells us that diverging member states preferences and 
concerns about the loss of control are major obstacles to institutional reform. But what if changes in 
the international environment necessitate institutional reform? This article examines such dilemma 
in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO has faced functional pressures 
to adjust its machinery to the post-Cold War era, but has at the same time seen its membership and 
the preference heterogeneity of the membership increase. The article finds that institutional change 
2is indeed difficult with multiple principals and uncertainty about the consequences of reform. Yet 
modest reform has still taken place. First, strong functional pressures can help the member states to 
overcome  their  differences  concerning  institutional  reform.  Second,  lower-level  incremental 
reforms, beyond the control of the member states, have made NATO a more efficient organization. 
The empirical focus is on the development of the understudied International Staff post-1989.
Keywords
International organizations, institutional change, International Staff, NATO, security
Introduction
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is no longer the organization it used to be. For the 
first four decades of its existence, it was mostly concerned with the collective defence of Western 
Europe. This meant contingency planning for a Soviet attack, keeping up military capabilities and 
having internal  dialogue between the  allies.  Since  the end of  the  Cold  War,  its  activities  have 
expanded.  NATO  has  also  become  active  in  the  field  of  crisis  management  through  military 
operations. It furthermore engages in partnerships with third states and international organizations 
in bringing about collective security. The new Strategic Concept (NATO 2010) indeed notes that 
NATO now has three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and collective security. 1
An important question is how substantive changes in international organizations affect the 
institutional machinery. Functionalist theory, for instance, expects institutions to follow substantive 
changes. As NATO carries out additional functions, there exists a clear rationale for institutional 
1 This substantive transformation of NATO is well-documented in the academic literature (Yost 1998; Kaplan 2004; 
Asmus 2004; Rynning 2005, 2012; Webber, Sperling and Smith 2012; Herd and Kriendler 2013; Mayer 2014). 
3reform (Wallander and Keohane 1999). We also know, however, that agreement among the member 
states constitutes a condition for change (e.g. Scharpf 1988; Pierson 2000; Tsebelis 2002; Nielson 
and Tierney 2003). And if anything, the membership and preference heterogeneity within NATO 
have increased since the end of the Cold War. NATO is thus an exciting case to explore the research 
question under which conditions do international organizations change their institutions.
The empirical focus of this article is on the NATO International Staff, which constitutes the 
permanent Brussels-based secretariat.2 The International Staff is headed by the Secretary-General 
and acts an agent of the member states in servicing the North Atlantic Council and its committees. It  
employs some 1250 officials and is at the heart of the machinery, yet constitutes only one part of the  
broader NATO system.3 Functionalist theory expects that the substantive changes in NATO have an 
impact on the International Staff. A redistribution of resources within the International Staff towards 
crisis management and collective security is likely. This may require changes in the organizational 
structure. Principals are, however, likely to object to such institutional changes. Some have a vested 
interest in collective defence and may resent the shift of resources. Others may fear the inevitable 
uncertainty that institutional reform brings in terms of future payoffs and control over NATO. 
As the  literature on multiple  principals  suggests,  this  article  shows that  substantive and 
institutional reform do not have to go hand-in-hand. The diverging preferences of the member states 
have been a major obstacle for institutional change. Even reform-minded member states, such as the 
United States, fear that they lose control over the International Staff as a result of the consequences 
of institutional reform. Modest reform has nonetheless taken place. First, functional pressures can 
help the member states to overcome their differences. Making the International Staff ready for the 
challenging operation in Afghanistan, for instance, has resulted in reform. Second, there has been an 
incremental reallocation of resources to improve NATO's functioning in crisis management and 
2 The International Staff remains understudied. This is one of the first articles to trace its institutional development 
since the end of the Cold War.
3 NATO also has a military decision-making structure with a Military Committee and an International Military Staff. 
In addition, NATO has an extensive command structure and various agencies. Mayer (2014) sheds light on some of 
the other NATO institutions. Reform efforts (continue to) take place in the whole NATO machinery.
4collective security. This process has mostly been beyond the formal control of the member states. 
To conclude, preference heterogeneity cannot fully account for the institutional development of the 
NATO International Staff.
The  starting  point  is  the  dilemma  in  the  literature  between  functionalism and  multiple 
principals in institutional reform. The article subsequently explores how the International Staff has 
focused increasingly on policy issues at the expense of support functions. It continues by tracing the 
three rounds of institutional reform. In the conclusion, the consequences for the scholarship on 
international organization are discussed.
Functionalism, Multiple Principals and Institutional Reform
Functionalist  theory  provides  a  useful  baseline  for  a  discussion on the  reform of  international 
organizations. It explains the existence of institutions in terms of their effects (Keohane 1984; also 
Pierson  2000).  The  NATO International  Staff  facilitates  the  work  of  the  Alliance  by  chairing 
committees, writing reports and decisions, monitoring the implementation of decisions and acting as 
a contact point for third parties. The member states could carry out these functions themselves, but 
they have 'outsourced' them (Tallberg 2002: 25) in the interests of neutrality, expertise, continuity 
and efficiency. It is interesting to add a temporal dimension to this functionalist theory (cf. Pierson 
2004). International organizations feel continuous pressure to adjust their functions and designs to 
environmental  demands  (Koremenos,  Lipson and Snidal  2001;  Dijkstra  2012).  For  the  case  of 
NATO, the functionalist story is thus the following: the environment has changed since the end of 
Cold War. NATO has expanded its functions to survive. This has affected its institutional design as  
well.
Institutional reform does, however, not always follow the functionalist road (e.g. Streeck and 
Thelen 2005). The literature on reform in international organizations deals, in particular, with the 
5problématique of  multiple  principals and preference  heterogeneity.  Daniel  Nielson and Michael 
Tierney (2003), for example, show that only after preference convergence of the member states, the 
World Bank started to make its lending policies more environmentally friendly. Fritz Scharpf (1988)  
comes to similar conclusions. He shows how policies such as the European Union's (EU) Common 
Agricultural Policy, which were once successful, became inefficient due to changing circumstances, 
yet were almost impossible to reform. George Tsebelis (2002) perhaps discusses these issues most 
elegantly in his work on veto players. He simply notes that “to change policies ... a certain number 
of ... actors have to agree to the proposed change” (p. 2). 
Institutional reform is often regarded to be even more difficult to achieve than substantive 
reform (Pierson 2000: 490-491). By being able to change the rules of the game, it becomes possible 
to engage in substantive reform afterwards. Multiple principals may therefore agree on a substantive 
change now, but are unlikely to agree to institutional change if there is uncertainty about how it  
affects their future payoffs (Jupille, Mattli and Snidal 2013). This creates a status quo bias. To put it 
differently, institutional change might well be better for all member states involved, but if they are 
uncertain about it, they may still decide to stick with what they have.
The case of NATO is illustrative. The member states have been reasonably successful in 
achieving substantive reform, but  much less  so with regard to institutional  reform. Substantive 
reform after the Cold War became inevitable for the survival of the alliance. To use the a popular 
phrase from a US senator,  NATO had to go “out-of-area or out of business” (Lugar 1993). The 
United States had a credible alternative, namely unilateral action. If the other member states had not 
(partially) given in to the demands of the United States, such as out-of-area operations and global 
partnerships, it would have meant the end of NATO. This has not meant, however, that member 
states have been willing to risk their institutional control over NATO and the International Staff.
Since the control mechanisms of the member states are such a central feature in the design 
of  international  organizations,  it  is  worth  discussing  how  member  states  exert  control  over 
6international secretariats. They use different mechanisms. First, member states control the resources 
of  secretariats,  such  as  budget  and  personnel.  These  resources  are  related  to  the  ability  of 
secretariats  to  affect  policy  outcomes  (e.g.  Biermann  and  Siebenhüner  2009;  Oestreich  2012; 
Dijkstra 2013). Second, high-level posts may be strategically distributed among the member states 
(Kleine 2013), while lower positions may be subject to geographical balance. Third, contract policy 
also affects control with staff on permanent contracts having more autonomy than 'temporaries' or 
'secondees'  (Trondal  2006;  Trondal,  van  den Berg and Suvarierol  2008).  Finally,  large member 
states may have privileged access allowing them to exert excessive informal influence (Stone 2011).
Faced with preference heterogeneity,  is  it  possible  to reform international  organizations? 
While scholars have suggested several 'exit mechanisms' from inefficient substantive policies (see 
Falkner 2011), possibilities for escape from institutional lock-ins are more limited.4 They concern 
mainly consensus-promoting mechanisms (Scharpf 1988 and Falkner 2011). Initiators of change 
need to convince the multiple principals that outcomes of reform are better than the status quo.  The 
negotiation process is thus important (Finke, König, Proksch and Tsebelis 2012). Scharpf (1988) 
concludes that only after a problem-solving rather than a confrontational style was adopted in EU 
and German negotiations,  the  principals were able  to  opt  for  reform. Such an approach seems 
important for NATO, where trust is critically important (Menon and Welsh 2011: 86). In realizing 
institutional reform, the involvement of an 'honest broker' makes sense (Abbott and Snidal 1998: 
22-23; Beach 2005; Tallberg 2006). Leadership by secretariat  staff in creating an atmosphere of 
trust, explaining the effects of the reforms, and exercising authority is thus important.
Secretariat officials can also try to circumvent the direct control of the member states, as 
control mechanisms are costly (e.g. Hawkins et al. 2006). Monitoring requires resources on the side 
of the principals, and the agent typically knows better how to run his/her own organization than the 
principals. It is therefore unrealistic to expect complete control. This gap naturally allows the NATO  
4 Several exit mechanisms to achieve substantive reform are side-payments and issue-linkage, changes in applicable 
law and venues (e.g. Treaty reform), intervention by supranational actors including courts, mobilization of private 
actors (Falkner 2011).
7International Staff some autonomy when it comes to smaller changes (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 
2002; Lake and McCubbins 2006: 343).5 For example, while the member states may dictate basic 
rules governing the recruitment of personnel, they may find it too costly to get involved in the  
selection procedure of individual applicants. Similarly, the allies may have ideas about the overall 
organization  of  their  secretariat,  including the  number of  divisions,  but  may want  to  leave the 
allocation of personnel within divisions to division heads. In other words, the high costs of control  
allow agents leeway over their organization.
Table 1. Drivers of institutional reform in international organizations
H1 Changing functions +
H2 Multiple principals -
H3 Secretariat leadership +
The literature thus identifies different drivers and obstacles for reform. They have been summarized 
in  three hypotheses  in  Table  1.  The  first  hypothesis  follows  from functionalist  theory  and  the 
expectation that a change in substantive functions will affect institutional design. The second one 
states that multiple principals, which have different preferences and are uncertain about the effects 
of  reform,  form an obstacle  to  institutional  change.  The final  hypothesis  notes  that  Secretariat 
leadership improves that chances of institutional change. These three hypotheses will be used to 
guide the empirical sections in the remainder of this article. They are mentioned where they help to 
explain instances of reform. The conclusion of this article further discusses the importance of these 
hypotheses and how they can be used to improve our understanding of institutional reform.
5 A competing hypothesis in the public administration literature is that bureaucrats themselves use their discretion to 
block institutional change (for classic statements on inertia and bureaucratic interests, see Merton 1940 and Downs 
1967). In the case of NATO, officials have an interest in keeping their organization relevant. This has made many of 
them, as will be shown empirically, advocates of institutional reform.
8More Tooth, Less Tail: The International Staff in Numbers
This first empirical section presents an overview of developments in the NATO International Staff 
(1989-2011)  with  an emphasis  on  staff  resources.  It  shows two things.  First,  the  expansion of 
NATO's substantive functions has not led to an increase in overall resources. The member states 
have kept the civil budget flat. This has been an obstacle for change, as it meant that staff resources 
for NATO's new tasks had to come at the expense of its original function. Second, member states 
have had much less control over how the civil budget is spent within the International Staff. Since  
the end-1990s, the number of policy staff has incrementally increased, while support staff has been 
cut. Savings at the lower end of the hierarchy have thus been used to allow the International Staff to  
work on NATO's new tasks. This is points towards the limits of full control by the member states.
The starting point is overall budgetary policy. For most of the last two decades, France has 
insisted on zero budgetary growth, as it sees NATO in direct competition with the emerging security 
structures in the EU (preference heterogeneity,  hypothesis #2).6 Without additional funds, it  has 
been difficult for the International Staff to increase numbers in spite of NATO's new core tasks. The  
International Staff has thus hardly grown since the end of the Cold War. It consisted of 1228 full-
time equivalent  posts  in 1989 and 1245.1 in  2011.7 In fact,  as a result  of  the economic  crisis, 
NATO's budget now no longer follows inflation, which means that the International Staff has to cut 
106 posts  by 2015  (interview #2,  #3 and #5).  Transforming an organization without  additional 
resources is difficult, as it means that new tasks come at the expense of old tasks. Particularly the 
Central and Eastern European allies object. Contrary to expeditionary-minded member states (e.g. 
United States and United Kingdom), they continue to have an interest in collective defence, as they 
consider Russia still a threat. This is evidence of how the interests of multiple member states are an 
obstacle to institutional reform (hypothesis #2).
6 Recently Germany and the United Kingdom have joined France albeit for different reasons (US Mission 2009; 
interview #5). 
7 All post-Cold War staff numbers have been provided by NATO officials.
9Yet despite such stringent constraints on staff resources, an incremental development within 
the  International  Staff  has  taken  place  since  the  end-1990s  prioritizing  policy  substance  over 
support functions. The timing of this development was not a coincidence. In 1999, NATO launched 
the military operation in Kosovo, thereby definitely establishing itself as one of the  key actors in 
the field of crisis management. This resulted in a number of structural reforms to the International 
Staff under Secretary-General Lord Robertson (see furthermore below). Most of the 2000s were 
about  preparing  the  challenging  military  operation  in  Afghanistan.  Troop deployments  reached 
record  levels  in  2010,  when some 140,000 soldiers  were  serving under  NATO command.  The 
Afghanistan mission created considerable pressure for the International Staff to reform itself and 
prioritize policy substance. 
There have been several important incremental changes. First of all, the balance within the 
International Staff has markedly changed. Since the late-1990s, the number of staff members in 
policy grades (A+U) has increased by 46% (148.1 posts), while the number of manual personnel (C 
grade) has decreased by almost 40% (137 posts) (see figure 1). The decrease in manual personnel 
became  possible  through  the  better  use  of  technology  and  more  efficient  working  methods 
(interview #11). Some of the security staff have also been outsourced (interview #7 and #11). These 
savings have not gone back to the member states, but have been used to expand the organization. 
This trend continues. For example, the current overall decrease in staff numbers will mostly impact 
on the support categories (interview #5).
10
In addition to this strong shift from technical to policy personnel, there are also developments in the 
allocation of resources between divisions. Executive Management, which brings together most of 
the support functions, for example, accounts for some 35% of officials. Under the current financial 
pressures, this overhead is being cut away (interview #12). Budgetary cuts are also made in the 
Public Diplomacy Division, which will become less of a priority with the end of the Afghanistan 
mission in  2014. Similarly,  the  Operations  Division will  decrease in  size.  These are  functional 
responses to the changes in the environment and therefore support hypothesis #1.
There  have  furthermore  been  structural  reforms.  To  increase  staff,  for  instance,  the 
Executive Secretariat was abolished in the early 2000s. Committee secretaries were integrated into 
the substantive divisions, thereby creating economies of scale (Kriendler 2005; interviewee #9). 
There have been attempts to bring the International Staff and International Military Staff closer 
together by means of co-location. One interviewee furthermore notes that “we have consultants, 
temporaries, interns and voluntary national contributions” (#9). Voluntary national contributions are 
Figure 1: Resources of NATO International Staff; data provided by NATO officials.
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interesting as they work at almost no cost to NATO. They stay for several months or years and there 
are normally around 30-50 at the same time (interview #11). 
Finally, staff consider that the workload has increased. One interviewee states that “[w]e 
have 2-3 times as much work as when I first joined” (#5). Another former official notes that he still  
has contact with some colleagues and that due to the heavy workload and uncertainty about the 
future, the “morale today is low”. As one interviewee sums it up “[r]eforms are good when you 
eliminate redundancies ... [b]ut when you have fewer personnel, this does not work, because people 
simply have to do more jobs. Staff gets more overworked, and thus makes more mistakes ... [t]here 
is a mismatch and you cannot stretch endlessly” (#8).
To conclude, budgetary policy has prevented overall increases in the International Staff and 
there is an ongoing effort to cut personnel. Generic rules, such as zero nominal or zero real growth, 
have been an important mechanism of control. It has prevented a sharp increase in staff following 
the various new tasks that NATO acquired post-1989. It has also made reform difficult amidst allies 
with  competing  preferences  (hypothesis  #2).  Yet  gradual  internal  reforms  have  made  the 
organization nonetheless considerably more efficient. Savings have not gone to the member states, 
but have been used to give the International Staff more tooth to deal with the new challenges of 
crisis management and collective security. There have been important changes behind the overall  
staff  numbers.  These  changes  show  that  full  control  of  international  secretariats  and  their 
institutional development by the member states is difficult. This is evidence for hypothesis #3. 
Reforming the NATO Secretariat after the Cold War
The second empirical part of the article analyzes the reform efforts more in detail. It traces the most 
important changes in the International Staff since 1989. It confirms that preference heterogeneity 
has been a major obstacle for reform (hypothesis #2). When faced with uncertainty on institutional 
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reform and the risk of losing control, allies prefer to stick with the  status quo. They have been 
particularly  reluctant  to  give  up  high-level  posts  in  the  organization  (hypothesis  #2).  Strong 
functional pressures have, nonetheless, led to changes (hypothesis #1). Secretariat leadership, on the 
other hand, has not been a sufficient condition for change (hypothesis #3). Secretaries-General have 
only made a significant impact in the area of employment policy. 
Before going to the reforms of the 2000s, it is useful to shortly discuss the development of 
the International Staff during the Cold War and the 1990s. The International Staff was created in 
1951 to  support  the Secretary-General  in  servicing  the  North Atlantic  Council  and the  various 
civilian committees. Although it was a sizable organization from the start,  employing some 650 
officials  in  1956  (Jordan  1967:  170),  the  emphasis  was  on  supportive  functions.  The  Political 
Division only consisted, for example, of 15 people. During the Cold War, the International Staff 
developed. By 1988, it consisted of five substantive divisions (Political Affairs; Defence Planning; 
Defence Support; Infrastructure; Science) and employed 1228 officials (NATO 1989; Mouritzen 
1990). 
The significance of the end of the Cold War was not lost on the member states. Already on 
5-6 July 1990, they issued the London Declaration “on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance”, in 
which they noted a function for NATO in the collective security of the European continent (NATO 
1990). It resulted in a plethora of partnerships and dialogues with Central and Eastern European 
countries, Russia and the former Soviet Republics.8 In addition, NATO was delegated a function in 
arms control and nuclear non-proliferation. This had a modest impact on the International Staff. It  
led to several changes within the Division of Political Affairs.
At  the  time of the fall  of the Berlin  War,  the Division of Political  Affairs  had 49 staff  
members of whom 25 worked on Information and Press (Mouritzen 1990). The remaining 24 were 
split between the Political Affairs and Economics Directorate. Due to post-Cold War developments, 
8 For example, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Mediterranean 
Dialogue. 
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the Political Affairs Directorate was expanded. It became home to five sections (Multilateral and 
Regional Affairs; Policy Planning; Partnership and Cooperation;  Disarmament, Arms Control and 
Cooperative Security; Verification and Implementation Coordination).9 Political Affairs thus gained 
liaison officers and staff servicing the new committees (NATO Handbook 1999; interview #1). It 
was a functional reform following the new tasks of NATO (support for hypothesis #1).
At least as important became NATO's new role in crisis management. Following the war in 
former Yugoslavia (1991-1995), the United Nations (UN) Security Council authorized NATO to 
carry out military missions to monitor and enforce sanctions and the no-fly zone. At a later stage, 
NATO was also tasked to provide the UN operation with air support. Finally, NATO received a 
mandate to engage in combat operations leading to the Dayton agreement of 1995, which in turn led 
to its ground operation Implementation Force (IFOR). These crisis management operations were 
new territory for NATO yet became soon part of, what some consider, its core business. 
These crisis management missions had, in particular, an impact on the NATO command 
structure,  which  almost  immediately  became  subject  of  institutional  reform  (e.g.  Barry  1996; 
Neumann 1998; Mayer 2014). It resulted, however,  also in developments within the International 
Staff (support for hypothesis #1). Notably, the member states established a Crisis Management and 
Operations Directorate within the Division of Defence Planning and Policy. The new directorate 
included sections on crisis management, council operations and peacekeeping (NATO 1999). By the 
end of the 1990s, the International Staff had thus made some staff available for crisis management 
and collective defence. In terms of overall structure, however, it still had the same five divisions as 
at the end of the Cold War. 
9 The NATO International Staff has several divisions. Each division has a number of directorates. Directorates may in 
turn consist of various sections.
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Robertson reforms
Secretary-General Robertson entered office in 1999 after a critically important year for NATO. In 
the spring, the alliance had launched an air campaign against Serbia over Kosovo without a UN 
Security Council mandate. It had also deployed 60.000 peacekeepers as part of its Kosovo Force 
(KFOR). Moreover,  NATO had seen its  first  post-Cold War enlargement round with the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland joining the alliance. Robertson's predecessor had taken little interest 
in institutional reform and had “left the place in a mess” (interview #3). Now that NATO had made 
a  definite  step  towards  crisis  management  and  expanded  its  membership,  the  modest  previous 
changes were no longer sufficient. Robertson's means were the NATO+ reforms, which he qualified 
as the “most radical internal change agenda in NATO’s history” (quoted in Kriendler 2005: 14).
Interviewees describe the Robertson reform, which aimed at making internal processes more 
efficient, as inclusive. As one interviewee stated “[t]he objective was to see how we can improve 
things. It was an stimulating attempt to involve all staff” (#4). John Kriendler, a former high-level 
official,  similarly  writes  (2005)  that  there  were  various  working  groups  dealing  with  different 
aspects of reform. This was perhaps also part of the problem. One interviewee noted that the mode 
was “[l]et's try everything ... [t]hey should have limited themselves. None of the projects hit their 
targets” (#5). After one-and-a-half year, the outside consultants hired for reform were sent home and 
very little reached the North Atlantic Council (interview #4). It was an instance of an overcrowded 
agenda and a lack of leadership (support for hypothesis #3).
The Robertson reforms were more significant in terms of structural changes. Following the 
intervention in Kosovo and with a view to the operation in Afghanistan, the Crisis Management and 
Operations Directorate became a division in its own right (Operations Division). This was a clear  
reflection of the priority area that crisis management operations had become for NATO. It was, once  
again,  the  logical  thing  to  do  from a  functionalist  perspective  (hypothesis  #1).  It  was  also an 
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instance in which the overriding interest of NATO trumped the parochial opposition of some of the 
member states, including some of the newer member states that continued to champion NATO's role 
in collective defence.
The establishment of the Operations Division set in motion some further structural changes. 
Since the Division of Defence Planning and Operations lost much of its staff, some offices were 
shuffled between what became the Division of Political Affairs and Security Policy (PASP) and the 
Division of Defence Policy and Plans (DPP). Many of these changes were “cosmetic” (interview #3 
and #6). Another reform was the creation of the Public Diplomacy Division (PDD), which merged 
the Office for Information and Press with the Science Division. While few people understood the 
logic, it gave press a higher profile in the organization. This was a reaction to Kosovo, which had  
resulted in a lot of exposure (interview #5 and #12). A side effect of the structural reorganization 
was the establishment of a new Assistant-Secretary-General (ASG) position, This allowed a high-
level  appointment  for  France  (Kriendler  2005).  Finally,  support  functions  were  merged  into  a 
behemoth called Executive Management.
The most important stamp that Robertson left on the International Staff was, however, his 
contract policy. Prior to Robertson's tenure, employment contracts had a duration of three years and 
were typically renewed once or twice. Once an official had worked for ten years, he/she got an 
indefinite contract. Robertson wanted to create a more permanent staff corps and to open up the 
possibilities for internal promotion. He therefore gave all personnel with a limited duration contract 
at once a permanent contract. From the principal-agent literature, this move was quite extraordinary. 
As  noted  above,  contract  policy  is  one  way  for  the  member  states  to  control  the  secretariat.  
Permanent officials have more autonomy than temporary staff, as they build up expertise and are 
more difficult to get rid of. That Robertson and successive Secretaries-General have had quite some 
authority over the contracts of their own staff is thus remarkable (interview #12). 
The appreciation in the International Staff of this reform was mixed (see also Mouritzen 
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2013: 6). As one official notes “Robertson woke up one morning and slipped back into good old 
Labour policy ... [w]e thought you are crazy, but we were not crazy enough not to take advantage” 
(#5).  Two (former) Private Office  interviewees completely agree.  One states  that  such contract 
policy “is a bummer, because people come in at 25/26 and then get a permanent contract for life. 
This is not the kind of flexibility that we need and that we are used to in my country”. The other 
agrees,  indefinite  contracts  “made  him  very  popular  but  it  was  not  a  smart  move  for  the 
organization”.
Others, on the other hand, identify with the need to have an esprit de corps and possibilities 
for internal career enhancement (interview #4 and #8). Many officials object to the fact that under 
Secretary-General Rasmussen, contract policy is going in the opposite direction. Since 2012, it is no 
longer possible for most policy staff to work in the International Staff for more than six years. As a 
result,  one interviewee notes,  “[w]e  will  no longer build  up experience like we used to”  (#5). 
Another states that “[a] lot of experience and memory gets lost. NATO is also no longer a career” 
(#8). Finally, one interviewee nuances the discussion: “there is some disquiet in the organization ... 
but we will get to a good balance eventually” (#2).
When taking a broader look at the institutional changes under Secretary-General Robertson, 
two issues are worth pointing out. First, through the creation of an Operations Division and a Public 
Diplomacy Division, the NATO International Staff was reformed to better deal with environmental 
demands on the organization. The creation of these two divisions was a to clear functional reaction 
following the interventions in Kosovo and Afghanistan (hypothesis #1). Second, Robertson has had 
a surprising amount of discretion in changing personnel policy. Most of these contract changes have 
been beyond the control of the member states (hypothesis #3). Contract policy was considered an 
internal issue for the International Staff.
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Vahr reforms
The Robertson reforms had hardly sunk in, when a new round of reform was initiated. The initiative 
came from the United States and its Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, who wanted to cut the 
overhead (interview #7). The new Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was not uninterested in 
reform, but he wanted to keep the initiative in his own hands (ibid.). He asked the member states to 
put forward a candidate to lead these reform efforts. This became Jesper Vahr, the current Director 
of the Private Office. Vahr had been the Danish Deputy Permanent Representative and was at the 
time the Director of Security Policy in Copenhagen. He was supported by four internal officials and 
they presented their proposal after one year (ibid.; interview #9).
It is important to point out that the Vahr reforms were not only about the International Staff. 
They also dealt with the working methods of the North Atlantic Council, the committees, and the 
interaction between the civilian and military elements of NATO governance (see Kriendler 2006 for 
details). Regarding the International Staff, Vahr wanted to have only “[t]hree 'super' policy divisions 
[i.e. operations, capabilities and partners] supported by enabling divisions” (ibid.: 2). Each of these 
divisions would address one of the core tasks of NATO. In other words, the approach was functional 
and included a major element of re-design. Vahr looked at NATO's core tasks and organized the 
International Staff accordingly. His report is can therefore be considered a functional benchmark 
against which actual reform can be measured.
While few interviewees dispute that Vahr wrote a good report (interview #6), the member 
states did little with it. One interviewee states bluntly: “He completely failed. Some nations did not 
consider his proposals bold enough, not practical enough, not interesting enough” (cf. Kriendler 
2006). A problem was perhaps the approach. As an interviewee noted, “[t]he Vahr reforms were 
presented as a package and it was indigestible for the nations. Elements have been cherry-picked” 
(#9). Similarly, someone stated “[h]e sold it in a confrontal manner. My way or the highway” (#6). 
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An interviewee argued that “he was not in a position of authority vis-à-vis the nations, and the staff 
and everyone” (#3). Importantly, once the United States realized that it would lose high-level posts 
in the International Staff as a result of the reforms, it withdrew its support (interview #7).
In other words, preference heterogeneity and the risk of the loss of control made the member 
states wary of the proposals (hypothesis #2). The bargaining style and the lack of leadership did not 
help either (hypothesis #3). Finally, contrary to the previous and 2012 reform efforts, there was less 
of a functional need  to change the organization (hypothesis #1). It is therefore not surprising that 
not much was implemented. In fact, few interviewees spontaneously talked about the Vahr reforms. 
One interesting change is perhaps the physical co-location of officials from the International Staff 
and  International  Military  Staff.  As  the  debates  over  co-location  display  some of  the  political 
struggles over institutional design, it is worth to elaborate a bit.
NATO has always had parallel civilian and military structures. In the Brussels headquarters, 
the International Staff supports the Secretary-General, the North Atlantic Council and the civilian 
committees. The International Military Staff provides the Military Committee with expertise. There 
is thus 'stove-piping' within NATO. In spite of the fact that individual officials are working on 
similar horizontal, thematic and area issues, the International Staff and International Military Staff 
traditionally hardly interact. Merging the relevant staffs could, from a functional perspective, lead to  
economies of scale (Kriendler 2005, 2006). 
Various member states have, however, always resisted integration. They have argued that the 
advice of the International Military Staff should not be 'contaminated' with all sorts of political and 
diplomatic considerations. This goes back to a Weberian and Huntington type of vision on political-
bureaucratic  and civil-military relations.  What  makes  this discussion complex is  the politicized 
separation  between  civilians  and  the  military  in  several  member  states.  This  has  made  full 
integration  of  the International  Staff  and International  Military Staff  a  bridge  too  far.  It  is  too 
politically sensitive for countries such as Germany and Turkey (support for hypothesis #2). Some of 
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the smaller member states fear that their position in the Military Committee gets undermined by 
SHAPE  expertise  (Mouritzen  2013:  9).  The  compromise  following  the  Vahr  report  was  to 
physically co-located offices without changing the reporting hierarchies.
The experience so far is mixed. One interviewee notes that “[i]t has proofed successful” 
(#9). Others question whether the impact was significant. An interviewee states that “[t]his has been 
a cosmetic change ... [t]he 100 meters between the offices was never the obstacle. People were 
already able to find each other” (#6). Similarly, one states “I do not see a difference. There is no 
difference, very little difference. Physical co-location is not the same as decision-making structures”  
(#2). Importantly is that the whole operation of moving offices has been costly. Furthermore, it is  
relevant to mention that when NATO moves into its new headquarters (currently foreseen in 2016), 
offices will continue to be co-located.
Finally, it is worth noting that under Secretary-General De Hoop Scheffer, the employment 
policy concerning getting an indefinite contact became more stringent. This was to counter negative 
effects from the Robertson reforms. In addition, De Hoop Scheffer has made a conscience effort to 
introduce rotation for senior posts. Several Deputy Assistant-Secretary-General posts, for example, 
were opened up for open competition leading to career advancement of internal candidates. He also 
insisted to choose his own Deputy Directors in the Private Office (from a shortlist provided by the 
relevant  member  state).10 These  changes  resulted  in  more  autonomy  and  are  an  instance  of 
secretariat leadership (hypothesis #3). 
Rasmussen reforms
The appointment of Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in 2009 resulted, once again, in 
momentum for reform. It started with the nomination itself. Turkey made clear that it was opposed 
10 The Private Office consists of a Director, who has the same nationality as the Secretary-General, and five Deputy 
Directors (FR, GE, UK, US and one rotating posts).
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to the Rasmussen candidature due to his stance as Danish Prime Minister during the Mohammed 
cartoon controversy in 2005-2006. Rasmussen therefore provided Turkey with various reassurances. 
He made a  public  statement  and he promised senior  positions  (Waterfield,  2009;  US Embassy 
Copenhagen 2009). He also appointed Vahr, who was at the time the Danish ambassador in Ankara 
(US Embassy Copenhagen 2009) and the most experienced Dane when it came to NATO issues, as 
his Director of the Private Office.
Giving senior positions to Turkey was never going to be easy, as it meant taking away posts 
from the other member states. The situation was, however, facilitated through the creation of a new 
division for Emerging Security Challenges (ESC). The division, a merger of various sections across 
the International Staff, would give forward-looking policy a stronger foothold in the organization in 
line with the new Strategic Concept. Turkey, however, did not like what it saw and rejected the post  
of Assistant-Secretary-General (interview #5). It received instead, in 2010, the position of Assistant-
Secretary-General for Defence Policy and Planning.
Much more fundamental reform was, however, suggested in 2011 in light of the economic 
crisis and the operation in Afghanistan resulting in the International Staff Review process. While 
some momentum came from the United States, Germany and like-minded allies (interview #5 and 
#12), the real leadership seems to have come from Secretary-General, Vahr and the Private Office.11 
Three options for the structural reform of the International Staff were discussed. The first option 
essentially built on the Vahr proposal of three super divisions plus Executive Management. These 
divisions would each deal with one of NATO's core tasks. In addition, there would be supporting 
offices with a low status. The second option consisted of supporting offices at a higher level. The 
third option was close to the status quo. 
In many ways, this reform effort would theoretically stand a better chance than the previous 
Vahr proposal. The ongoing economic crisis – and the corresponding budgetary pressures – has 
11 Already before Rasmussen entered office he stated that headquarters reform and flexibility in staffing were among 
his priorities (US Embassy Copenhagen 2009). 
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made International Staff reform an even greater necessity. The approach to reform under Rasmussen 
had a much stronger problem-solving dynamic (hypothesis #3). In addition, this latest reform effort 
benefited from the personal leadership of the Secretary-General . Despite all these odds in favor of 
the Rasmussen reforms, the member states still decided to not to adopt the package. The priorities  
of the member states in international security remain heterogeneous and, as a result, the member 
states could not agree on how to distribute key posts in this new structure (hypothesis #2).
It is useful to shortly discuss these senior posts further, as they are an important way for the 
member states of exerting influence (Kleine 2013). Traditionally, member states have monopolized 
strategic posts in NATO. Germany, for example, has long occupied Political Affairs as this division 
deals with Russia. Defence Investment has been for the United States. The United Kingdom has had 
the  Assistant-Secretary-General  for  Operations.  The  Wikileaks  telegrams  are,  in  this  respect, 
illuminating. While the US “has always been among the strongest proponents of NATO reform” 
(US Mission 2009; cf. US Embassy Copenhagen 2009),  the State Department makes clear that 
“[a]llies who pay a large share of the budget and who present well-qualified candidates should 
retain some rights to a minimum quota of positions.  If  not legacy positions,  perhaps ...  legacy 
numbers” (US State Department 2009). And when it comes to security, intelligence and defence 
investment, the US wants to keep control (ibid.).
This 'flags-to-posts' system has become a major impediment to International Staff reform. 
The accession of many new countries and the return of France to the military command has meant 
that many more member states now qualify for top-level positions. De Hoop Scheffer already set in 
motion a process to end legacy positions and Rasmussen has been effective in opening up all jobs, 
including those of Assistant-Secretary-General, to open competition.12 The trouble is, however, with 
the reduction of senior positions. Creating new posts (e.g. Assistant-Secretaries-General for Public 
Diplomacy and Emerging Challenges) was easy, but if the International Staff is downsized to three 
12 The open competition for Assistant-Secretaries-General in 2013 has meant the end of a number of legacy positions. 
Germany, for example, 'lost' Political Affairs to Greece. Germany was nonetheless 'compensated' with the post of 
Defence Planning and Policy. The major allies thus remain represented at the highest bureaucratic level.
22
divisions,  it  becomes  difficult  for  the  member  states  to  get  senior  posts.  This  makes  control 
uncertain (hypothesis #2) and might result in unwanted effects.
The Rasmussen reforms were, in some respects, a test-case for change at NATO. Austerity 
created a rationale for reform and the Rasmussen team had the experience needed. That significant 
structural reform was not achieved signifies the importance that member states attach to the control 
of NATO. It was unclear how institutional change would affect the senior managerial level and 
thereby the access that member states have to the highest level of policy-making (hypothesis #2). 
While reducing the International Staff to three divisions was not achieved, Rasmussen was more 
successful in incremental reforms relating to personnel policy. He changed employment contracts 
from permanent to temporary. In addition, he achieved some results in opening up high-level jobs to 
open competition (hypothesis #3).
CONCLUSION
Many international organizations face pressures to adjust their institutions to changing international 
environments. Oftentimes, they are held hostage by disagreements among the member states. The 
case of NATO is an obvious example. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has started various 
partnerships and has launched many military operations. How has this change in functions informed 
institutional design in light of multiple principals and diverging preferences?
This article has shown that institutional form does not automatically follow function.13 The 
preference heterogeneity of the member states has, as expected, been a major obstacle for change 
(support  for  hypothesis  #2).  First,  several  member  states  have  continuously  insisted  on  zero 
budgetary growth. This has prevented NATO from recruiting personnel. New activities thus had to 
come at the expense of existing ones, while the newer member states continued to insist on NATO's  
13 The data in this article comes mostly from interviews, as most NATO documents are classified. While efforts have 
been made to ensure the accuracy of the data (see also acknowledgements), interview data has its drawbacks. These 
need to be taken into account with a view to the conclusions.
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role in collective defence. Second, the member states, including the United States, have been very 
reluctant to give up the high-level posts for the risk of losing control. Third, the member states, 
including Germany and Turkey, have not been able to agree on a merger of the International Staff  
and the Military Staff. The member states care about the NATO International Staff and want to keep 
control (Mouritzen 2013).
Yet modest institutional reform has still taken place. The establishment of the Operations 
Division was perhaps the clearest reaction to functional demands (hypothesis #1). But so have been 
developments in the offices dealing with partnerships and press. The key question, of course, for  
further research, is under which conditions functional demands trump diverging preferences. There 
have also been several incremental developments in the International Staff, which have gone mostly 
unnoticed.  Beyond  the  control  of  the  member  states,  policy  tasks  have  been prioritized  at  the 
expense of support functions. Policy staff has gone up by 46% in a decade. The Secretaries-General 
have been influential in changing the details of contract policy and opening up senior positions to 
open competition. This is evidence for hypothesis #3. When it comes to structural changes in the 
organization, however, secretariat leadership has not proved a sufficient condition for reform. The 
member states have defied the political entrepreneurship of Rasmussen and Vahr. Member states 
preferences and the uncertainty about outcomes remained too large obstacles to overcome. 
This article has been about discussing institutional change in the specific case of the NATO 
secretariat,  but the findings have relevance for international organizations more generally. Many 
international organizations are subject to environmental change and have to adjust their machinery 
to keep up. It is important to recognize, in this respect, that the dominant role of member states as 
veto players needs to be nuanced. The member states are not fully immune to systemic pressures 
nor incremental developments, both of which can have a tangible effect. Importantly, however, in 
the case of NATO, they have resisted structural  reforms that touched upon their  control of the 
International Staff. Changes to top-level bureaucratic positions are one obvious example. This is 
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clearly something that has relevance to many international organizations (Kleine 2013). 
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